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Liquidity has emerged as a key concept in the new field of macro-finance. Following the 
financial crisis, policy economists now pay increasing attention to the processes by which 
private financial actors produce liquidity and leverage their balance sheets (Adrian and Shin, 
2010). This reflects a growing recognition that the practices that enable institutions to raise 
cash and trade assets in financial markets can have important implications for financial 
stability and broader macroeconomic conditions (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Yet by 
placing the focus squarely on the balance sheet dynamics of private financial actors, macro-
finance tacitly assumes that the role of the state can be reduced to backstopping and 
accommodating the financial system in times of crisis. For macro-finance, then, liquidity 
emerges as a fundamental but ultimately only technical problem.
This forum contribution critically rethinks the macro-financial approach to liquidity by 
focusing more explicitly on its public-private hybrid dimension. Starting from the assumption 
that the monetary system is fundamentally a payments system that is structured around a web 
of interlocking balance sheets (Gabor and Vestergaard, 2018; Mehrling, 2017), what matters 
from the perspective of critical macro-finance is precisely how the positioning of both public 
authorities and private actors shape the functioning of this system. Far from a merely 
technical problem, the argument advanced here is that liquidity is always conditioned both by 
private sector balance sheet dynamics and their entanglements with public authorities: how 
states and their central banks situate themselves within the payments system has significant 
consequences for which trades can be made profitably and which actors gain in importance 
over time. In this sense, liquidity is more productively understood as a fault line in the 
governance of monetary relations that touches upon broader and deeply political questions 
about the organisation of the payments system. 
To make this case, I introduce the notion of a ‘liquidity regime’. As a heuristic device, this 
allows us to analyse and historicise the politics implicit in the hybrid, public-private 
arrangements and mechanisms that govern the coherence of the payments system at a given 
time. Building on the work of Minsky (1957), Mehrling (2011), and Aglietta (2018), the notion 
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relations and institutions can undermine the organisation of the payments system in the 
medium-to-long term. A key insight is that the ability to make markets and access liquidity is 
never neutral or apolitical: as policymakers struggle to dampen credit volatility without 
suppressing private liquidity generation altogether, they invariably confer power to those 
financial actors considered integral to monetary governance (see Braun, 2018). What 
deserves closer attention, therefore, is how public authorities approach liquidity and who 
benefits from the resulting governance arrangements through which liquidity is nurtured.
Funding liquidity and market liquidity
The current policy literature breaks up discussions of liquidity into two categories: funding 
liquidity and market liquidity (see, for example, Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Tirole, 
2011). Funding liquidity refers to the ability of a financial institution to raise cash. Sometimes 
associated with the liability side of a balance sheet, the concept can be traced back to the 
analysis of liquidity within traditional, bank-based financial systems. Here, a bank holds short-
term liabilities (deposits) against long-term assets (loans). When confronted with sudden 
deposit withdrawals, the bank might be required to sell some of its assets in a ‘fire sale’ or 
acquire funding by borrowing in the interbank market. Yet if there is a general loss of 
confidence in the bank (for instance, during a bank run), other banks might no longer be 
willing to lend to this particular bank or its counterparties, leading to a broader liquidity freeze 
in the interbank market. In that case, the bank might be forced to draw on emergency liquidity 
assistance from the central bank. By stepping in as lender of last resort, the central bank 
plays an important role in supporting funding liquidity and restoring confidence in the 
interbank market – a function that has been well recognised since the nineteenth century 
(Goodhart, 1994). 
Market liquidity, by contrast, describes the ability to trade an asset in the market at short 
notice with little impact on its price. The concept of market liquidity has gained in importance 
with the rise of market-based banking since the 1980s and 90s, as banks and other 
institutions have moved away from relational banking and towards the securities trading and 
investment business (Hardie and Howarth, 2013). Here, financial actors no longer hold loans 
and assets on their balance sheets but increasingly repackage them into tradable securities. 
For this reason, market liquidity is sometimes associated with the asset side of a financial 
actor’s balance sheet. Dealers or market-makers play an important role in this process by 
providing market liquidity to securities markets by offering buy and sell prices in specific 
securities and profiting on the spread between them (Stigum and Crescenzi, 2007). The repo 
market in particular enables dealers to exploit arbitrage positions more effectively by allowing 
them to finance their inventory of securities directly in the market (Gabor, 2016). 
With the rise of market-based banking, many market observers expected the importance 
of funding liquidity to decline (e.g. CGFS, 1999). After all, if the asset side of financial actors' 
balance sheets consist of tradable securities, there should be less need for these actors to 
obtain external funding for their financial liabilities. This idea, however, proved problematic on 
two accounts. Firstly, funding liquidity remains necessary to take positions, because trading 
always requires capital. While a dealer can buy a security and then pledge it as collateral, they 
cannot refinance the entire price in the market. The difference between the price of a security 
and its collateral value is denoted as the margin, or haircut, and must be funded by the dealer 
directly (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). For this reason, a securities dealer usually 
maintains a credit line to a bank as a critical backstop to its trading activities. The second 
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problem is that while access to market liquidity might help an individual institution overcome 
maturity mismatches, it can never fulfil this role for the financial system as a whole: market 
liquidity can evaporate in particular market segments when there are no more buyers in a 
falling market, such as when market participants crowd into ‘safe assets’ (Borio, 2009). 
To address these shortcomings, recent research in mainstream macro-finance has 
started to analyse funding and market liquidity together. As brought home by the global 
financial crisis, a decline in asset prices can easily translate into funding difficulties for 
particular institutions; and vice versa, funding difficulties that lead to fire sales can exacerbate 
declines in asset values. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) have defined such events as 
downward ‘liquidity spirals’. Consider the example of securities dealers who finance their 
trading activities in the repo market. As dealers fund their activities by repo-ing out some of 
their securities inventory as collateral, they need to watch the asset value of the underlying 
collateral: in repo transactions, collateral assets are marked-to-market on a daily basis. When 
collateral assets fall in price, dealers will be required to provide additional collateral or cash in 
order to satisfy margin requirements. The dealers then need to obtain additional funding 
liquidity through expensive bank borrowing or, in the last instance, through the fire sale of 
assets in a falling market (Gabor, 2016; Mehrling, 2011). Yet when dealers are forced to scale 
down their balance sheets by selling assets, their attempt to obtain funding liquidity will exert 
further downward pressure on asset prices and worsen market liquidity conditions. As the 
destabilisation of asset values exacerbates funding problems for individual institutions, the 
positive feedback loop continues, and downward liquidity spirals become systemic. 
Here it is not enough for the central bank to support bank funding conditions through its 
emergency lending operations (see Mehrling, 2011; Tucker, 2018). What matters is the ability 
of dealers to stabilise asset prices by finding an immediate buyer. The central bank can play 
an important role here by stepping into the market and becoming a dealer or market-maker of 
last resort. For instance, during the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve put a floor on asset 
prices by intervening in the short-term money market. By acting as central counterparty 
between borrowers and lenders, the Federal Reserve effectively took over the market-making 
function that had previously been filled by the private dealer system (Mehrling, 2011). 
Conceptually, the move to a market-maker of last resort function reflects a growing recognition 
that in market-based systems, financial stability requires central banks to support liquidity 
also in collateral markets, rather than simply by lending to individual financial actors.
Liquidity and the payments system
A macro-financial approach helps us understand the pro-cyclical effects that the leverage and 
liquidity operations of dealer-banks can have on markets, both domestically and 
internationally. Through borrowing and lending in foreign currency, banks can side-step 
national monetary settings and influence financial conditions globally (Bayoumi, 2017). 
Similarly, non-bank actors such as hedge funds and asset managers can contribute to the 
build-up of asset bubbles in emerging market debt securities by searching for yield in 
international bond markets (Shin, 2013). Collectively, these insights allow for a more nuanced 
view on the pace and rhythm of financial activity and can help policymakers monitor financial 
conditions across markets and borders. 
Despite these advances, mainstream macro-finance economists have encountered 
considerable difficulties in operationalising their understanding of liquidity. A key issue is that 
as a measure of overall ‘ease of financing’ conditions, liquidity remains an essentially 
unobservable condition of the financial system. What is missing, according to the Bank for 
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International Settlements, is an equilibrium concept or operational benchmark against which 
market developments can be judged (CGFS, 2011). The implication is that liquidity can only be 
measured by proxy, such as with investors’ risk appetite or the terms and conditions on which 
credit is granted (funding conditions, bid-ask spreads, collateral terms and so on). Yet 
depending on which factors are selected for analysis, and how they are applied, measures of 
liquidity can vary considerably. Not for the first time, liquidity reveals itself as a multifaceted 
and complex phenomenon that is difficult to capture and formalise within the conventions of 
economics (see Beggs, 2012).
At the heart of this ambiguity is the fact that liquidity continues to be understood primarily 
as a technical, rather than a political, issue. Within the policy-oriented macro-finance 
literature, complex arrangements of credit creation, liquidity and leverage are primarily 
analysed in terms of their ability to ensure the smooth functioning of financial markets (Knafo, 
2020). Such an approach implicitly frames states and their central banks as external actors, 
and their interventions merely technocratic adaptations to the needs of capital. This 
significantly downplays the role that political decisions play in developing particular market 
segments. Recent studies of the repo market, for instance, show that policymakers and 
regulators were instrumental in nurturing its liquidity by encouraging financial practices such 
as collateral intermediation in a bid to govern through this market (Gabor, 2016; Wansleben, 
2020). As a growing body of literature on the ‘public-private hybridity’ of finance attests, these 
forms of entanglement have a generative and ordering quality with respect to market activity 
(e.g. Braun, 2018; Hockett and Omarova, 2017; Mehrling, 2011). Far from simple 
administrative and regulatory authorities, public authorities such as central banks are 
therefore better understood as market actors whose role in selectively supporting liquidity is 
integral to market activity itself (Cooper and Konings, 2015). 
The challenge for a critical political economy of macro-finance is precisely to make explicit 
the systemic nature of the linkages between public authorities and private actors. Critical 
macro-finance finds a useful starting point in the Minskian tradition, which has long 
emphasised the centrality of liquidity in credit systems structured around a set of unstable, 
interlocking and hierarchical payment relations (e.g. Mehrling, 2011; Minsky, 1993). What this 
approach allows us to consider is how the structure of interconnected balance sheets can 
either dissipate or reinforce underlying economic conditions. While for Minsky the 
management of cash inflow-outflow commitments is the most immediate constraint that 
actors face, the ability to relax individual balance sheet constraints by taking on new debt 
always depends on the willingness of others to accept these liabilities as viable promises to 
pay. Liquidity is thus never a free good, but always depends on actors with sufficiently large 
balance sheets to make markets by trading in a variety of monetary claims (Christophers, 
2015). As ‘dealers in debt’, actors such as banks therefore play a significant role in relaxing 
the constraint on smaller balance sheets. Yet there are limits to the ability of private actors to 
provide liquidity: position taking depends on the ability to make profit, and crucially, balance 
sheet operations cannot eradicate the ultimate uncertainty tied up with a heterogenous set of 
credit claims (Sgambati, 2016).
It is here that we can begin to recognise the role of the state, whose significance comes 
not merely from its ability to act as backstop to the system, but rather from its fundamental 
role as organising force within the payments system. Take the example of commercial banking, 
which for historical reasons is deeply entangled with state power. For one, interbank balances 
can be cleared in central bank reserves, the ultimate source of liquidity for a system under 
direct central bank control (Aglietta, 2018). Yet more broadly speaking, amidst deposit 
insurance schemes, capital and liquidity requirements, regulatory valuation of assets and 
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liabilities, as well as resolution planning, it is difficult not to think of bank balance sheets as a 
“bundle of contingent claims” on the state (Gelpern, 2014: 356). This has significant 
consequences for how banks conduct business, allowing them to leverage public trust for their 
own commercial operations and provide liquidity to a broader set of market participants 
(Hockett and Omarova, 2017). 
Yet as the development of ‘shadow money’ forms attests (Murau and Pforr, 2020), state 
entanglement with market processes goes far beyond traditional banking (see also Braun 
2018). As Gabor (2020) shows, the state plays an important and expanding role in de-risking a 
broader set of asset-liability positions, with important consequences for those entities that 
carry these claims on their balance sheets. Often, de-risking involves strategic cooperation 
with private sector interests, such as in the creation of green asset taxonomies. In this 
monetary dimension, the state surfaces then not necessarily as an active managerial 
institution, but rather as a constitutive component of markets. Its capacity to influence 
economic activity is conditioned by its ability to productively induce private risk bearing – that 
is, to manage credit volatility without suppressing private liquidity generation altogether. What 
warrants ongoing attention, then, is how the positioning of public authorities and private actors 
within the webs of payment systems shape, structure, and facilitate forms of credit expansion 
and allocation by reorganising particular investment strategies.
Liquidity regimes and monetary governance
For critical macro-finance, the fundamental challenge is to analyse and historicise the politics 
implicit in the organisation of the payments system. As outlined in the previous section, the 
payments system is structured by a set of hierarchical balance sheets, whose individual ability 
to relax their liquidity constraints is tightly intertwined with the positioning of the state within 
the system. For monetary governance, a key question then is how to organise the payments 
system in such a way that allows for a degree of elasticity suitable for both the expansion and 
allocation of credit in a stable fashion. We can think of the mechanisms that provide this 
elasticity as comprising a specific liquidity regime – that is, a historically contingent public-
private hybrid array of social, institutional, and market arrangements that govern the 
circulation of credit. The advantage of adopting such a systemic, critical macro-finance 
perspective is that it allows us to analyse both how such ensembles of social relations and 
institutions achieve coherence, and how subtle changes to existing arrangements can 
contribute to the endogenous build-up of instabilities in the medium-to-long term (Blyth and 
Matthijs, 2017). 
Following Minsky (1957), we can conceptualise change within this hybrid regime as 
driven by private or public dynamics. On the private side, the liquidity regime is shaped by 
evolutionary dynamics as financial actors change their behaviour in response to profit 
incentives. Oftentimes, this takes the form of devising new techniques that relax individual 
balance sheet constraints, for instance through the development of new trading, accounting, 
or leverage practices. On the public side, the liquidity regime is shaped by policy initiatives and 
legislative or regulatory changes, often in response to a perceived malfunction of the financial 
system – such as a failure of existing monetary, prudential, or fiscal policy structures to 
prevent the build-up of ‘excess elasticity’ within the system. The interaction of these dynamics 
forces a constant repurposing and reorganisation of existing social and institutional 
mechanisms as actors adjust their behaviour (Collier, 2009; Konings, 2010). 
A crucial implication is that in the governance of monetary relations, the state-economy 
boundary (Mitchell, 1991) is profoundly shaped by the question of liquidity. As the state 
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situates itself within the payments system, its positioning always shapes which trades can be 
made profitably and which actors gain in importance over time. Yet it is important to 
remember that the state is not a unitary actor, and the goals of the central bank, treasury, and 
other regulatory authorities are not always aligned: monetary, fiscal, and financial stability 
objectives often impose conflicting demands on public institutions. For instance, while 
policymakers nurtured the repo market because it helped both generate demand for sovereign 
debt and enhance monetary policy transmission (Braun, 2018; Gabor, 2016), the pro-
cyclicality of collateral intermediation poses financial stability problems that need to be 
negotiated as monetary governance evolves through the ruptures of crises (Sissoko, 2019). In 
this context, the articulation of the boundary between public and private becomes an 
inherently political project: it plays a significant role not only in the development of private 
financial power (Braun, 2018), but also shapes the contours of the state itself as policymakers 
are forced to strategically situate themselves and their interventions within the wider social 
networks of financialised activity (Beggs, 2016).
The implementation of the Basel III reforms in the United States is a case in point. 
Seeking to redress the instabilities inherent in a market-based financial system, these reforms 
have created new interdependencies between private market participants and the Federal 
Reserve as regulators have restructured bank operations away from riskier investment 
portfolios (Christophers et al., 2017). If previously, money market participants had primarily 
lent to each other, in the aftermath of the reforms they are now more closely connected to the 
balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. For instance, new liquidity provisions require banks to 
hold extra central bank reserves or Treasuries as safe assets. In this new institutional context, 
the Federal Reserve’s expanded balance sheet is no longer a hangover from crisis intervention 
and Quantitative Easing; it has become a structural feature of market organisation (Pozsar, 
2016). As the Federal Reserve’s efforts to shrink its balance sheet and return to monetary 
policy ‘normalcy’ from 2016 onwards show, the strains that reserve reductions induce on bank 
balance sheets can easily lead to funding dislocations for other actors that depend on bank 
credit lines in times of stress – most notably producing a set of repo rate spikes at quarter 
ends (Avalos et al., 2019). In a Basel III world, it is increasingly clear that liquidity depends not 
just on the business models and market making activities of private finance, but also quite 
profoundly on how the Federal Reserve juggles its monetary policy and financial stability 
commitments. 
With its emphasis on the politics of financial plumbing, critical macro-finance allows us to 
uncover how – and in whose interest – this liquidity regime is organised. Macro-financial policy 
links liquidity to private balance sheet capacity and commits monetary governance to finding 
mechanisms that both facilitate and stabilise balance sheet expansion. Yet as monetary 
statecraft increasingly shores up the ability of the private sector to bear market risks, the de-
risking of private balance sheets emphasises their social usefulness as market makers. This 
perspective itself runs the risk of downplaying the social costs associated with working through 
private financial actors when providing liquidity. What makes the private sector such a 
dynamic but unstable force is precisely that it is in the business of making profit: the primary 
interest of private actors is not in making markets for others, but rather in acquiring market 
share and pricing power for themselves (Sgambati, 2019). At times, this contradiction forces 
the central bank to directly support speculative financial practices. As research by the BIS 
shows, the Federal Reserve’s intervention in the repo markets in late 2019 served – at least 
partially – to prop up leveraged hedge funds that relied on repo financing to fund arbitrage 
trades between cash bonds and derivatives, foreshadowing the far greater forms of central 
bank support for private equity rolled out in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis (Schrimpf et al., 
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2020). Far from a mere technical issue, then, financial plumbing is infused with relations of 
power that render it inherently political.
Conclusion
Critical macro-finance directs our attention to the role of liquidity in shaping the processes and 
structures of financial activity. Starting from the assumption that the monetary system is a 
payments system, it allows us to explore how economic actors construct, acquire, and 
negotiate monetary claims in their everyday activities. As this contribution has suggested, a 
critical macro-finance view thereby highlights the need to politicise and historicise the 
evolution of particular ‘liquidity regimes’, taking into account both the micro-dynamics of 
individual balance sheets that facilitate market expansion, and the macro-dynamics of 
regulatory apparatuses and policy settings that structure, stabilise, and facilitate these forms 
of expansion. 
A key insight that emerges from this approach is that the ability to access liquidity is 
never apolitical. Organised around profit motives, the private credit system tends to produce 
excess elasticity as actors routinely overextend their balance sheets, requiring the 
development of new forms of social control over these modes of expansion. In this context, 
what requires closer attention is precisely how the interaction between public authorities and 
private market participants affords some actors greater leverage in shaping the financial 
system. It is by focusing on the institutional specifics and politics inherent to these 
infrastructural arrangements that critical macro-finance allows us to unpack and critically 
reflect upon the power of finance.
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